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TAKE OFF YOUR HAT! 
The banishment of Rev. Giuseppe Cortis, 1824 - 1825 
Evelyn Pullicino • 
Francis Rawdon, the seventy year old Marquis of Hastings and second 
Earl of Mo ira, was ~hosen as the Governor of Malta after the death ofThomas 
Maitland. 1 This General who had started his long military career as an 
ensign in the 15th Foot, had returned from India where he had been a 
Governor General for ten years just a few months before arriving in Malta.2 
Hastings assumed the duties of Governor when he took his oath of office on 
7 June 1824.3 His was a short governorship for he died two years later on 28 
November 1826.4 
No sooner had he arrived in Malta, that the new governor had to deal 
with an incident which had occurred prior to his arrival - an affair that was 
to irritate the British because of the way the Vatican judged it. The culprit at 
the centre of this incident was a priest of St. Paul's Collegiate Church in 
Valletta. While a procession with the Holy Sacrament was passing through 
the streets of the city on 18 January 1824, Rev. Giuseppe Cortis, the Master 
of Ceremonies of this Church, approached a British off-lcer of the Royal 
Artillery in uniform, a Mr. Matthias. Cortis asked the officer to take off his 
cap as a sign of respect towards the Holy Sacrament as was usually done by 
all the Maltese. Then the priest 'violently un capped him twice.'5 Matthias 
does not seem to have reacted to this offence surrounded as he was by the 
devout congregation participating in the procession. He did, h.owever, report 
the event to his superiors. Since the incident took place only the day after 
Maitland's death, the authorities did not take any measures at first. When 
news of what had happened reached him, Ferdinando Mattei, th~ Bishop of 
Malta, sent for Rev. Cortis arid admonished him without allowing Cortis to 
state the case in his defence: 
senza entrare nel merito delle mgioni che flrse avrebbe potuto 
addurre in suo filVore it Prete, fit acremente rimproverato, ed 
ammonito, e precettato a regolarsi per l'atlllenire con tutta 
prudenziale maniem. 6 
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This would have been another insignificant incident similar to those 
which sometimes ardent Catholic devotees indulged in against Protestant 
ministers or functions? had not the British authorities given the affair a 
great deal of attention and importance. On 3 February 1824, the Lt. 
Governor, Manley Power, wrote to Mattei about what had happened asking 
for strict measures to be taken against the guilty priest. 
Power's letter is important for two reasons. It showed that the British 
administrators saw the religious freedom that the Maltese had and the respect 
that they themselves showed towards the dominant religion, as great 
concessions on the part of a colonial power. On their part the Maltese 
believed this to be their inalienable right and certainly never thought of 
their religious freedom as a 'gift' from the British sovereign. Secondly, this 
letter amounts to a declaration in an official document that deplorable 
incidents between Catholics and Protestants on the Island did occur. 
Officially, however, these clashes were rarely, if ever, mentioned. 
In his letter, the Lt. Governor explained that the British had always 
supported the dominant Catholic Religion: 
.... . and that it has always shewn Itself most anxious to punish 
any infraction of such Orders, and to cement the Bonds of Union 
and goodwill betwixt His Majesty's Catholic and Protestant Subjects 
in these Possessions. 8 
This was on the whole true. Such a statement, however, certainly jarred 
at the time. The Maltese Bishop was still coming to terms with the Mortmain 
Law enacted by Maitland in 1822, about which he had not been consulted 
at all. 9 Worse still, the Lt. Governor was ready to point a finger at him as 
'Head of the Catholic Church' advising him to: 
take the most efficient measures for securing His Majesty's Protestant 
Subjects from insult and outrage on the part of the Catholics, and 
more especially of the Clergy who ought so well to appreciate the 
benefits they enjoy in the free exercise of their religion and their 
religious Rites under the mild Government of the Island in which 
they live. 10 
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These 'benefits' were seen by the majority of the Maltese, and not 
only by the likes of Cortis, as their fundamental right and, therefore, certainly 
not as a gift which the British Sovereign could grant or withhold. They 
believed that theirs' was the only true religion. Other people, be they of 
another domination or wielding worldly power, had to respect it! 
Then, Lt. Governor Manley Power explained that he wanted to 'bring 
this case forward as I understand it is by no means a solitary one ..... '. 11 This 
reference to the case not being the only one of its kind certainly indicates 
that the British were aware of the general displeasure of the Maltese when 
viewing the British presence as a Protestant one. Manley Power was therefore 
going to use the Cords case as an example to other detractors. 
As we have seen, Mattei's immediate reply was that he had already 
scolded Cords. It seems that the Lt. Governor and the Bishop had spoken 
about the matter before they corresponded between themselves about it. 
The Maltese prelate had suggested to the British Lt. Governor various 
measures that they could take against the culprit. At the same time, however, 
Mattei was not too eager to have the priest punished too harshly: 
io per vari riflessi, e singolarmente per quello che specialmente 
m'incombe di intimare certe lJertenze piu' da Padre e buon Pastore 
che da Giudice, proposi all'Eccellenza V(ost)ra Onorabile diversi e 
va"i progetti. 12 
Despite the Bishop's suggestions, Rev. Giuseppe Cortis appeared on 
the 9 February before the Ecclesiastical tribunal. 13 As a priest Cords could 
not account for his 'misdeed' in front of a Civil Court; the Crown Advocate 
had to accuse him before the Ecclesiastical Court. 14 
Cortis was found guilty. The Court suspended him from the office of 
Master of Ceremonies for six months. He was imprisoned in the Convent 
of the Dominicans in Rabat for fifteen days and interdicted for ten years 
from asking for any 'ecclesiastical benefice, pension or other emolument.'15 
So tough was the sentence that Cords understandably appealed to Rome. 
After some time however, he gave up the case and presented it]:o the Vatican 
for consideration extra-judicially. At Rome the Canons of St. Paul's Collegiate 
Church used their influence to tarnish the Bishop's image. The Vatican 
decided that Cortis was only guilty of being too zealous, and this had led 
him to imprudent actions; a totally different verdict from that of the 
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Ecclesiastical Tribunal in Malta. This, however, seems to have been quite a 
realistic appraisal of the whole inciden t, although one should assume that at 
Rome, Cortis did his utmost to minimize his guilt. 
When the new governor, the Marquis of Hastings arrived in Malta in 
June 1824,16 he immediately made contact with the Vatican's Secretary of 
State, then Cardinal dell a Somaglia, about this matter. Once more it was 
the British Governor who defended the Maltese Bishop in his letters to 
Rome: 'Je puis arrester a Votre Eminence que la procede de Mons. 
l' Archeveque a ete en tout parfaitement Sage et Equitable.' Hastings oHicially 
stated more than once that this was to serve as an example to all other 
members of the clergy who might be tempted to act in the same way as 
Cords had done. Here was another indication that the British were trying 
to make the most of this case and tending therefore to blow up the whole 
Issue. 
The way the Vatican had judged the actions of this individual priest 
had not pleased the British at all. How could the British make an example 
(or rather a scapegoat) of someone who was only guilty of being too keen 
about his religion in a place like Malta, and considering that the individual 
concerned was a priest? Cords would have become a martyr for his religion 
and the British cruel persecutors. The British did not need the image of a 
saint but one of an irresponsible person who, through his actions, highly 
risked to ignite a useless disturbance which might have cost the lives of 
innocent people. The portrayal of audacity and guilt would have acted as 
an example to other detractors. That of innocent zeal ~ould have been 
dangerous. It would have simply encouraged other Catholics, whether priests 
or lay, to act similarly. It would also have given the impression to the Maltese 
that the British had acted incorrectly towards a Catholic priest. The British 
knew the importance with which the Maltese held their religious beliefs 
and the great influence that the clergy had in Maltese society. Therefore, 
they knew the danger of such a notion. It would certainly not have induced 
the islanders to view the colonialists in a friendly way as they had generally 
done up to now. 
Consequently, Hastings could not but protest to the Holy See's 
Secretary of State, Cardinal della Somaglia, for classifying Cortis' motive in 
performing his action simply as 'zele Imprudent,' when, according to him, 
the incident could have led to bloodshed! In February 1825, Hastings 
explained to Somaglia that the British oHicer could have brought upon 
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himself the wrath of the crowd had he not remained calm. Had he reacted 
to the insult the outcome would have been different. In such a case the use 
of force would have been indispensable to re-establish law and order: 'le 
Feu des Troupes aurait pu etre trouve indispensable pour n!primer l' errante. '17 
Hastings informed Somaglia that although Cortis in Rome had claimed 
that he had taken off the officer's cap in a polite way, the Ecclesiastical Court 
in Malta had not believed his witnesses, for all the other disinterested 
spectators had affirmed the contrary. So the British Governor accused the 
priest of having spurred his witnesses to commit perjury in Rome: 'Cortis 
n'a qu'ajouter a son premier delit le 'crime d'avoir instigue la Parjure.'18 
Besides, he claimed that Rev. Cortis had tried to convince Sir Richard Plasket, 
the Chief Secretary to Government, to abandon the case. When Plasket 
refused, Cortis decided to abandon his appeal in Rome, allegedly, because 
he had realized that all the details of his oftence would be revealed. According 
to Hastings, Cortis made it seem that he had submitted entirely to the Maltese 
Ecclesiastical Court's sentence, but he secretly went to Rome and presented 
his case under 'a false oath'. 19 The Governor tlnished his letter with a serious 
warning to Somaglia: Somaglias approval of the priest's conduct could 
encourage similar incidents. Hastings attested that he was ready to have the 
guilty ecclesiastic tried by a Conseilde Gtterre (a Court Martial) for an attempt 
against the Peace of the Garrison, if this happened. He had informed Mattei 
about his reproach to Somaglia in order to warn all his clergy that this would 
be the way that similar detractors would be treated.20 
One of the misfortunes of Cortis was that he was connected to St. 
Paul's Collegiate and aspiring to become one of the Canons of that Church. 
The rebellious Canons who had been at loggerheads with their Bishop for 
some years presented his name to Mattei when there was a vacancy in March 
1825.21 The Bishop refused the nomination and instead another priest was 
given the vacant canoncy. It was here that the Vatican's Secretary of State, 
Cardinal della Somaglia, intervened again and asked the Bishop to grant the 
first vacant canoncy to Cortis whether in the Cathedral Chapter or at St. 
Paul's Collegiate ChurchY The Vatican was following the policy that its 
decision had supercededthat of the Ecclesiastical Court in Malta which had 
established that the priest was not to be entitled to any sort of emolument 
for ten years. Mattei does not seem to have accepted the Vatican's decision 
and resorted to the tactics he had mastered so well in Maitland's time: he 
had the letter sent to the British Governor who at the time was in London. 23 
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The Bishop was relying on Hasting's reaction to solve the problem that 
Somaglia had raised for him in the diocese. If the first vacancy was to occur 
in the Cathedral Chapter, Mattei certainly would never have agreed to have 
a priest from St. Paul's Collegiate Church as one of his Canons. 
The Marquis of Hastings had to· use very strong language in 
communicating to Somaglia the British Government's displeasure at the 
Vatican's decision. He accused the Holy See's Secretary of State of basing 
his praise for Cortis on unreliable information, mainly Cortis' own testimony 
and other witnesses whose evidence could not be well scrutinized. According 
to Hastings, His Eminence was not taking into account the grave 
consequences that the priest's actions could have induced. Like MaitIand 
before him, the Governor expressed his wish to be informed of the Vatican's 
expectations. After all he was in charge of 'the executive power' at Malta. 
Had Somaglia consulted him about the Vatican's decision beforehand, he 
would have helped to limit the priest's punishment. The British government 
considered the fact that the Vatican had ordered Mattei to grant a canoncy 
to Cortis as a lack of respect towards it: '1I a echappe a la perspicacite de 
votre Emminence, combi~n une intervention si arbitraire manque d'egards 
vers I'autorite de la Majeste Britannique.'24 He even remarked on the 
inconvenience for the Vatican, of having incurred the displeasure of the 
British Government: ' ..... je supplie V(otre) E(mminence) de refflechir sur 
I'inconvenient immanquable en perseverant a donner de tels degouts au 
Gouvernement Britannique.' 25 
Once again Hastings insisted that the Holy See's attitude could 
encourage similar incidents and that this was a serious threat to public 
security. He informed Somaglia that Cortis was being deported from Malta 
and that similar offenders would receive the same treatment. Of course, 
according to the governor, this could not be classified as forced deportation 
for the priest was free to choose his destination! 
If est fibre de devisir son demeure partout aifleurs; et meme 
f'argent necessaire pour fes frais de son voyage fui serait flitrni, en fe 
prevenant toujours que son retour a Mafte serait penui commente 
forfeit. 26 
At this point the Marquis of Hastings resorted to negotiations for he 
informed Somaglia that he would intervene for Cortis with the British 
92 STOR]A '98 
Ministers as a sign of respect towards His Eminence if the latter revoked his 
order to Mattei to grant the first vacant canoncy to the priest. Despite this 
suggestion, Hastings did not hesitate to assure Somaglia that he had treated 
the Catholic Religion on the Island with respect for he felt not only a political 
but also a moral obligation to treat the cult of the Maltese people 
'reverentially' (une deftrence reverentiel1e)Y Was Cortis, at this point, just a 
pawn between the British Government and the Vatican? 
Earl Bathurst, the British Secretary for War and the Colonies, had 
already given the necessary orders to the Officer Administering the 
Government in Malta to have Cortis sent to Rome. 28 Bathurst also gave 
instructions not to allow the priest back on the Island unless Mattei informed 
the Government that Somaglia's order had been revoked. A few days later it 
was decided to offer Cortis the option 'of proceeding to Sicily or elsewhere 
ifhe should prefer it to going to Rome. '29 The British hoped in this way not 
to make the 'removal' of Cortis look like 'banishment'PO 
To make sure that Cortis did not receive any emolument, they asked 
Mattei to inform them about every vacant canoncy at St. Paul's Collegiate 
Church and the Mdina Cathedral. The Bishop of Malta was also to inform 
them to whom he intended to grant the vacant canoncies.31 Mattei refused 
categorically, showing that when he chose he could take a firm stand. In his 
letter to the Government, the Bishop stated clearly that this would have 
diminished the Ecclesiastical liberty of the Church and he did not feel 
authorized to accept such a new procedure.32 At the same time, Mattei 
assured the British that he would not conter any Ecclesiastical Benefice to 
persons whose conduct was not acceptable to the government: 'a persone, la 
di cui condotta conosco essere sospetta al Governo. '33 Since Cortis was one 
of this category, Mattei was confirming his intention to disobey Somaglia! 
In the meantime, Somaglia sec;ms to have yielded to the pressures 
made by the British government for in November 1825 he did revoke his 
first decision. He never informed Mattei himself but made Cardinal De 
Gregorio write to Mattei to inform him of the new decision. 34 
Despite the changing views of the Vatican's Secretary of State the Revd. 
Cortis however did not return to the Island. It was only in 1828, during 
Ponsonby's governorship, that he was allowed back to Malta and that after 
his mother Evangelista had written to the Bishop in April of the same year.35 
The case of Cortis was of great significance. The British became aware 
that a section of the population was beyond their jurisdiction: there were 
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some 1000 diocesan priests in Malta at the time, 839 in Malta and 127 in 
GOZO.36 
It became imperative to eradicate this privilege of c1erical'immunity if 
they were to administer the Island's judiciary. The great influence of the 
Church in Malta lay in its having this continual link with the common 
people through its clergy. The Maltese Catholics, most of whom were 
illiterate, still considered the priests as the most important persons in their 
villages. What the priests upheld was practically as sacred as the Gospel they 
preached to their villagers. If these priests, therefore, decided to be against 
the ruling colonial power, the consequences could be dangerous. The British 
would be in no position to deal with clerical upstarts for they could only be 
tried in an Ecclesiastical Court. They had effectively banished Cortis. 
Banishment, however, was no solution if a number of priests decided to 
protest at once. The case of Rev. Giuseppe Cortis had been dealt with by the 
Episcopal Court in Malta as they had desired, but he had been greeted as 
'zealous' by the Vatican. If this is what Britain could expect, dealing with the 
problem of immunity acquired priority. It became clear that negotiations 
with Rome depended on diplomatic transactions and therefore, on the 
individuals in key positions at any given moment. Previously, Maidand had 
always managed to convince Consalvi, who was the Vatican's Secretary of 
State at the time. Hastings had found that more pressure was needed with a 
Secretary of State like Somaglia. At the same time the British realized that if 
they put the right kind of diplomatic pressure on Rome, they could get the 
results they wished for, without stimulating any unwanted reactions on the 
Island. This technique was to be used a few years later by the British in order 
to eliminate the judicial advantages that the Catholic Church had in Malta. 
Mattei does not seem to have been aware of the long term repercussions 
that his reliance on British governors could induce. When he had informed 
Hastings of the Vatican's decision to grant a canoncy to Cortis, he was trying 
to safeguard his position, especially, against the wishes of the Canons of St. 
Paul's Collegiate Church. He had however resisted informing the British 
about all the vacant canoncies as they had asked him to do, fo'r Mattei rightly 
pointed out, this was beyond their jurisdiction. Cortis was connected with 
St. Paul's Collegiate Church so he could not expect Mattei to go out of his 
way to help him. His only guarantee of safety was the fact that he was a 
priest. Had he been a lay person he would have been dealt with by the 
British in the civil courts and no intervention from Rome would have been 
possible. 
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